Context effects in recognition tests are twofold. First, presenting familiar contexts at a test leads to an attribution of context familiarity to a recognition probe, which has been dubbed Ôcontext-dependent recognitionÕ. Second, reinstating the exact study context for a particular target in a recognition test cues recollection of an item-context association, resulting in Ôcontext-dependent discriminationÕ. Here we investigated how these two context effects are expressed in metacognitive monitoring (confidence judgments) and metacognitive control (ÔdonÕt knowÕ responding) of retrieval. We used faces as studied items, landscape photographs as study and test contexts and both free-and forced-report 2AFC recognition tests. In terms of context-dependent recognition, the results document that presenting familiar contexts at test leads to higher confidence and lower rates of ÔdonÕt knowÕ responses compared to novel contexts, while having no effect on forced-report recognition accuracy. In terms of context-dependent discrimination, the results show that reinstated contexts further boost confidence and reduce ÔdonÕt knowÕ responding compared to familiar contexts, while affecting forced-report recognition accuracy only when contribution of recollection to recognition performance is high. Together, our results demonstrate that metacognitive measures are sensitive to context effects, sometimes even more so than recognition measures.
the products of their memory processes, then, according to the Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) framework, it would also determine the probability of volunteering retrieved information in free-report memory tests, affecting the number of correct and incorrect details reported. Thus, for example, context reinstatement may benefit memory retrieval and at the same time make people more confident that the products of retrieval are correct, increasing the chances that retrieved details are disclosed. But it is also possible that context would affect metacognitive processes even when it has no effect on memory. As described in the next section, research on context effects in recognition identified conditions under which context present at study and later provided at test failed to affect recognition accuracy in forced-report tests. However, if context were to affect metacognitive processes under such circumstances, then it could lead to changes in free-report recognition output, demonstrating how context may exert influence upon memory performance via metacognitive, not memory processes. Such a demonstration was the main motivation behind conducting the present study.
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In the present study we aim to investigate how changes in study-test contexts affect metacognitive processes. To this aim, we borrow the paradigm previously used to examine the effects of context reinstatement on recognition performance and we use this paradigm to investigate how study-test contexts determines confidence (metacognitive monitoring) and decisions whether to volunteer responses to a memory question or to respond DK (metacognitive control) . In what follows, we first present an overview of the literature on context reinstatement in recognition and then we outline our predictions of how context may affect metacognitive processes.
Context effects in recognition
The most comprehensive work on context effects in recognition was conducted by Murnane and Phelps (1993 , 1994 within the theoretical framework ICE (Item, Context, and Ensemble information) theory (cf. Murnane, Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999) .
According to this theory, when items are presented with context at study, three types of information can be encoded: a) item information, b) context information, and c) information specific to an ensemble created by an item and its context, to which we will refer here as an item-context association 1 . When, in a subsequent old/new recognition test, a studied context is re-presented together with a novel or old probe, it matches the stored context information, resulting in a feeling of familiarity. Familiarity of the context is attributed to the test probe, increasing the probability of an ÔoldÕ response. Importantly, this occurs whenever studied context is used in a test, independently of whether the probe it accompanies corresponds to an item studied in this particular context. The same effect on ÔoldÕ responses occurs both for 1 In the present work we do not differentiate between a global-matching approach to recognition memory, as advocated by Murnane et al. (1999) , and a dual-process approach promoted by other researchers (e.g., Macken, 2002) , as we believe that these two are quite similar in their descriptions of the context effects. In other words, from the perspective of our study, we do not see much difference between the concept of matching ensemble information to contents of a memory store and recollection of item-context associations. For convenience, we use the term of recollection of item-context associations in the present paper, rather than the global matching terminology of ICE.
targets studied in different contexts and for foils which were not studied at all. In consequence, studied contexts presented at test increase both hits to studied items, whether they were paired with this particular context or not, and false alarms to foils. This type of effect Murnane et al. dubbed context-dependent recognition. A different effect may sometimes occur when at test context is re-presented with the same particular item with which it was paired at study. In such a case, inclusion of both the item and its originally paired context in a compound cue may result in recollection of the item-context association. Recollection of this association also induces more ÔoldÕ responses.
However, such a recollection necessarily occurs only for studied items and thus recollection of item-context associations specifically increases hits to old items but not false alarms to foils. This type of effect Murnane et al. (1999) dubbed context-dependent discrimination, as a specific increase in hits for targets means that participants are better at discriminating between targets and foils.
The empirical studies on context effects largely followed the directions outlined within the ICE theory. Hockley, Bancroft, & Bryant (2012) reviewed the results of a number of conditions employed in various studies on context effects in recognition and found that false alarm rates to foils tested in studied contexts are invariably larger than false alarm rates to foils tested in novel contexts, which supports the idea of context-dependent recognition (see also Dodson & Shimamura, 2000; Hockley, 2008) . However, the issue of contextdependent discrimination remains more controversial. To make a strong case for contextdependent discrimination, a comparison is needed between a condition in which the exact context accompanying encoding of a given item is reinstated at test for this item (a reinstated context condition) with a condition in which a studied context is used at test in a novel targetcontext configuration (a re-paired context condition). Such a comparison holds the familiarity of a context equal, eliminating the influence of context-dependent recognition, and thus Hockley (2008) showed that contextdependent discrimination requires a specific orienting task at encoding. Only when participants were explicitly instructed to associate items with their contexts at study, did the hit rate in the reinstated context condition (and also the rate of ÔrememberÕ responses) exceed the hit rate in the re-paired context condition, indicating context-dependent discrimination.
Thus, the study by Hockley suggests that the amount of attention devoted to encoding itemcontext associations is crucial for the presence of context-dependent discrimination. When attention is not directed toward such associations, they are not very likely to be retrieved even when the exact context is reinstated at test, impeding the chances of documenting contextdependent discrimination.
Several studies used faces, the stimuli adopted for the present investigation, as materials in research on context reinstatement (Kerr & Winograd, 1982; Watkins, Ho, & Tulving, 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977) . These studies found indications of both context-dependent recognition (increase in false alarms with familiar contexts) and contextdependent discrimination in memory for faces (as assessed either with corrected recognition scores or forced-choice recognition accuracy). Importantly, all these studies used associative instructions at study, designed to promote creation of associations between target faces and their contexts. Two more recent studies that examined context effects in memory for faces included a re-paired context condition, which allows for dissociating the effects of context familiarity and reinstating the specific item-context pairing. Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Masson (2007) used associative study instructions at study and found a higher hit rate in the re-paired
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context condition compared to the novel context condition and a higher false alarm rate to foils in studied contexts compared to foils in novel contexts, supporting the concept of context-dependent recognition. They also found an increased hit rate and the rate of ÔrememberÕ responses in the reinstated context condition as compared to the re-paired context condition, consistent with the pattern observed by Macken (2002) and also by Hockley (2008, Experiment 5B), and supporting context-dependent discrimination. Reder et al. (2013) also used associative study instructions but found no evidence for context-dependent discrimination for unknown faces (although such evidence emerged for famous faces). Reder et al. hypothesized that it could be particularly difficult for participants to create associations between unknown faces and context images that would later support recollection. These results underscore the point made by Hockley (2008) that documenting context-dependent discrimination is unlikely when creation of item-context associations at study is impeded.
The present study
In the present study we asked how context-dependent recognition and discrimination affect metacognitive processes of monitoring and control of retrieval. We start outlining our predictions with context-dependent discrimination, which is a facilitation of retrieval of itemcontext associations for reinstated contexts. Numerous studies have shown that metacognitive processes at retrieval are strongly affected by recollective processes (e.g., Bulevich & Thomas, 2012; Koriat, 1993) . It is a straightforward prediction that whenever recollection is triggered by context reinstatement, participants should become more confident in their candidate responses, which should be reflected in both confidence judgments concerning forced-report responses (confidence should be higher when recollection is augmented) and also their decisions to volunteer candidate responses in a free-report test (more responses should be volunteered when recollection is augmented). Thus, in the case of contextContext reinstatement and metacognition 9 dependent discrimination, we essentially predict parallel effects on memory and metacognitive measures.
A potentially more interesting scenario arises for context-dependent recognition, where we predicted a dissociation of memory and metacognitive measures. The effect of context-dependent recognition occurs when context familiarity is attributed to a recognition probe, increasing both hits and false alarms in old/new recognition test but not affecting recognition discrimination. The question that we asked was whether context familiarity would also increase confidence in a candidate response and increase the probability that this candidate response would be volunteered. Our previous investigation of the effects of familiarity on metacognitive processes (Hanczakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka, & Mazzoni, 2013) suggests that familiarity that is irrelevant for recognition discrimination may nevertheless affect confidence and DK responding. In this study, we showed that when paired associates are studied and the recognition task requires indicating a target which was paired with a given cue, cue familiarity is attributed to a candidate response in a recognition test. This inflates confidence that this response is correct and makes it more likely that this response would be volunteered. Although the cue in the paired-associates task differs from context inasmuch as the cue is vital for the task at hand (choosing target associated with this cue), whereas context is not, we predicted that the effects of familiarity will be the same in these two scenarios.
Thus, we predicted that context familiarity would increase confidence that a candidate response is correct and reduce DK responding, while having no effect on forced-report recognition accuracy.
To test our predictions, we adopted the paradigm used to investigate context reinstatement in recognition. In our particular version of the paradigm participants studied compounds of face and landscape photographs and their memory for faces was later tested with a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test with a context (landscape) Critically, we supplemented our 2AFC recognition test with a stage in which metacognitive monitoring in the shape of confidence was assessed, as well as with a stage in which exerting metacognitive control was allowed and participants could withhold a response. Thus, in each trial of the test, participants were presented with test stimuli (two faces and a context photograph) and they were first asked to indicate the studied face only when they were sure their response was correct and to respond DK otherwise (a free-report step). After that, they were asked to indicate which they thought was the studied face, even if it required guessing (a forced-report step). Finally, they were asked to rate their confidence in the forced-report response (see , for this type of testing). The means of confidence judgments and the proportions of DK responses across conditions were our measures of metacognitive processes whereas the hit rate on forced-report recognition was our measure of memory retrieval processes (cf. Higham, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) .
2 The 2AFC test was used here rather than the standard old/new recognition test in order to circumvent the problems of distinguishing between context effects on bias and discrimination. In the present study we were interested in examining context effects on metacognitive processes both when context affects participantsÕ ability to discriminate between targets and foils and also when it does not. Although numerous methods for deriving measures of discrimination on the old/new test have been proposed (some based on signal detection theory and some on multinomial processing tree models), there is currently no consensus on which of these measures appropriately distinguish between discrimination and bias to call any test probe ÔoldÕ. There is, however, a consensus that 2AFC tests are essentially bias-free (except for the left-right bias which is further discussed in footnotes 4, 5 and 6) and that any differences between conditions on such a test reflect differences in participantsÕ ability to discriminate between targets and foils.
Fifty undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for course credit.
A set of 96 black-and-white photographs of faces (a mixed set with male and female faces in equal proportions, all of them Caucasian) from the Psychological Image Collection at Stirling and another of 64 black-and-white photographs of landscapes from various Internet sources were assembled. The set of faces was divided into two subsets (A and B) of 48 faces (with approximately equal proportions of male and female faces in both subsets). One of these subsets served as study material and the other as a source of foils for a recognition test, which was counterbalanced across participants. Each face from the subset A was randomly yoked with a face from the subset B and with an individual context photograph of a landscape. The yoking of faces was done without regard to the sex of the yoked faces, which meant that pairs consisting of two male, two female, and one male and one female faces were created.
At study, faces were presented with their yoked context photographs. At test, both yoked faces were presented with a context photograph. If a studied face was assigned to the reinstated context condition, the context photograph presented at test was a photograph yoked with this pair of faces. If a studied face was assigned to the re-paired context condition, the context photograph presented at test was a photograph yoked with another pair of faces. If a studied face was assigned to the novel context condition, the context photograph presented at test was one of the 16 landscape photographs not yoked with any pair of faces. An equal number of studied faces were assigned to each of the three conditions (16) and this assignment was counterbalanced across participants.
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The design had one independent variable manipulated within-participants: context condition (reinstated, re-paired, novel). Dependent variables of interest were: the rate of DK responses in free-report recognition, accuracy in forced-report recognition and mean confidence judgments in forced-report decisions.
In the study phase participants were presented with 48 images of a face together with a landscape photo. The images shared a border and the face was always presented on the right. Each face-landscape pair was presented for 5 s and participants were instructed to look at both photographs. They were also forewarned about an unspecified memory test. The test directly followed the study phase. Each trial at test included three steps. First, two faces were presented on a screen with a landscape photo between them. Half of the studied faces were presented on the left and half were presented on the right.
Participants were instructed to indicate which of the presented faces, the one on the left or the one on the right, was presented at study. They were informed that a context photo may help them make this decision. They were further instructed that accuracy was crucial in this step and thus an additional option to respond DK was made available and they should use it whenever they were not sure of their response. Second, immediately after the free-report decision, the same set of photographs was presented and participants were asked to indicate the face presented at study even if it required guessing. Third, they were asked to provide a confidence judgment concerning the correctness of their response in the preceding, forcedreport step. The judgment was made by typing a value between 50 and 100 and participants were instructed that 50% corresponds to a chance level. The photographs were not presented on the screen during the confidence judgment stage of the test trial. All stages of the test were self-paced.
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The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . We start with the presentation of forced-report recognition accuracy, which is assumed to reflect memory processes unaffected by metacognitive effects (cf. Higham, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) . A one-way ANOVA on accuracy of forced-report recognition failed to reveal a significant effect of the context condition, F(2, 98) = 1.580, MSE = .022, p = .211, η p 2 = .031. No difference between novel and re-paired context conditions was expected as familiarity of the test context should not affect participantsÕ ability to discriminate between targets and foils. Of main interest, however, is that accuracy in the reinstated context condition did not differ reliably from accuracy in the re-paired context condition. Any such difference would indicate contextdependent discrimination, which is better memory performance in the presence of the exact context that was paired with a given target at study. Such enhanced performance would suggest that reinstated contexts aided recollection of item-context associations. However, based on the previous findings (Hockley, 2008; Reder et al., 2013) , we expected recollection to play a negligible role in our design and this null effect seems at first blush consistent with our expectations. One could note that performance in the reinstated context condition was slightly better than in the re-paired context condition, although this was not reliable even with a one-tailed t-test, t (49 The interpretation of the metacognitive results needs to be broken in two parts that are related to the issues context-dependent recognition and discrimination. Addressing first context-dependent recognition, we predicted that higher context familiarity in the re-paired than in the novel context condition would be attributed to a candidate response, inflating confidence and reducing DK responding compared to the novel context condition, in which context was unfamiliar. A comparison of the re-paired and novel context conditions supports our prediction. Thus, context familiarity, which does not allow participants to discern which of the test stimuli should be endorsed as previously studied, can induce in people more confidence that their candidate responses are indeed correct. In other words, the manipulation of context familiarity results in a confidence-accuracy dissociation by which context familiarity determines confidence in oneÕs candidate responses even though it does not affect the accuracy of these responses. 4 In the study phase of all experiments reported here, face photograph was presented to the right of the landscape photograph. In all tests, the target faces within each condition appeared equally often to the left and to the right of the context photograph. In this way, any differences between conditions cannot be explained by participantsÕ bias towards the side on which faces were originally presented at study (i.e., right). To establish if participants were biased to choose faces presented on the right, we performed an additional analysis of forced-report accuracy with the side on which a target face was presented at test as a factor. If participants chose faces on the right more often, this should result in better accuracy when the target face was presented on the right. However, no such effect was observed as both the main effect of the side factor and the interaction with a context condition were not significant, Fs < 1. We also re-analysed the data for confidence and DK responding with the position of the target face as a factor but in these analyses the additional factor also failed to produce any reliable effects (lowest p = .66).
Turning now to the issue of context-dependent discrimination, a comparison of reinstated and re-paired context conditions produced reliable differences in metacognitive measures which remain inconsistent with our initial predictions. We predicted that metacognitive effects for this comparison will track the effects obtained in the memory measure of forced-report recognition accuracy, but despite equal accuracy between reinstated and re-paired context conditions, we still found reliably higher confidence and lower rate of DK responses for reinstated contexts. In other words, the pattern of results for reinstated and re-paired conditions revealed yet another confidence-accuracy dissociation. Because reinstated and re-paired context condition are equated in terms of context familiarity, the metacognitive differences between these conditions necessarily reflect the influence of the specific item-context association re-presented at test in the reinstated context condition but not in the re-paired context condition. Hence, the metacognitive effects of reinstating context seem to reflect augmented retrieval of item-context associations, which affects metacognitive measures but not the memory measure.
In formulating our initial predictions we assumed that the presence of contextdependent discrimination speaks directly to the issue of recollection of item-context associations: when recognition accuracy in the reinstated (vs. re-paired) context condition is enhanced, this shows that item-context associations are recollected, but when accuracy is equal between conditions, this shows that associations are not recollected. The results from metacognitive measures demonstrate, however, that our logic was wrong and that the lack of context-dependent discrimination in the recognition accuracy measure (the proportion of hits in forced-report 2AFC test in our case) cannot be taken as evidence that context reinstatement does not affect recollection of item-context associations. What we missed in our initial reasoning is that recognition accuracy measure may simply be insensitive to changes in memory processes. If recognition performance can be supported by memory information Our strategy in the present experiment was to further facilitate recollection of itemcontext associations by using specific associative instructions at study. Numerous studies have found that with associative study instructions the effects of context reinstatement are revealed in the measures of recognition accuracy (e.g., Hockley, 2008; Watkins et al., 1976) , presumably because directing participantsÕ attention to item-context associations enhances their encoding (Hockley & Cristi, 1996) , at the same time increasing the probability of their Forty-six undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for course credit.
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All elements of the present experiment were the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception in the study phase. After the presentation of each pair of images, participants were asked to rate how well a presented face fits its context photograph on a scale from 1 to 6.
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . A one-way ANOVA on the accuracy of forced-report recognition yielded a significant effect of the context condition, this issue in favor of the double-mechanism account. In the present experiment, the difference in DK responding between reinstated and re-paired conditions occurred together with a parallel difference in forced-report recognition accuracy. This clearly points toward recollective underpinnings of this result. By contrast, the difference in DK responding 5 For Experiment 2, we repeated the analyses of whether the side on which the target face was presented at test affected forced-report recognition accuracy. Again, the side on which target face was presented did not affect accuracy in any way, as both the main effect of the side factor and the interaction with the context condition were not significant, Fs < 1. Additional analyses of confidence and DK responding with the side factor revealed that the side on which target was presented did affect confidence (F(1, 45) = 6.47, p = .01, for the main effect of the side, with higher confidence if the target face was presented on the right), but not DK responding. Other effects involving this factor were not significant (lowest p = .34). We offer no explanation for the effect of side of target presentation on confidence, which failed to replicate in Experiments 1 and 3.
between re-paired and novel context conditions occurred once again without a trace of a difference in forced-report recognition accuracy between these conditions. This indicates that recollection of item-context associations, successfully strengthened in this experiment, is not responsible for the discussed metacognitive effect. Instead, it should be assigned to the mechanism of attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response.
One unexpected feature of the present results is that a difference in the mean of confidence judgments between the re-paired and novel context conditions failed to reach the level of statistical significance. How should one interpret this apparent null result? One possibility is that participants were more confident about their responses in the re-paired context condition, but this was not picked up by the measure used in the confidence judgment task. We note here that just as recognition accuracy is only an imperfect measure of recognition processes, as the results of Experiment 1 clearly demonstrate, confidence judgments are only an imperfect measure of internal subjective confidence and thus insights from other measures are necessary to make inferences about these directly unobservable cognitive representations of confidence (cf. Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, Pasek, & Higham, 2013) . The results concerning DK responding, an alternative measure of metacognitive processes included in our design, certainly give credence to the claim that the discussed null effect is spurious. Re-paired and novel context conditions clearly differed in the rate of DK responses, and this difference is difficult to explain unless these conditions differed also in participantsÕ internal confidence assigned to candidate responses.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the encoding instructions introduced in Experiment 2 diminished the effects of context familiarity on metacognitive measures. This could occur because under conditions of strong recollection participants could have largely stopped relying on familiarity to choose a target face. If participants rely less on familiarity when recollection is more readily available (under associative study instructions), then
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presumably the role of context familiarity in shaping metacognitive processes also becomes limited, and thus is reliably present only for DK responses but not confidence judgments.
Experiment 3 was designed to unequivocally answer the question of whether the metacognitive effects of attributing context familiarity to candidate responses occur when participants rely on recollection in the final test.
In the present experiment we wanted to create conditions in which correct responding in a recognition test would be highly dependent on recollection of item-context associations.
The main question addressed under these conditions would be if people still use context familiarity as a basis for metacognitive processes. If such an effect was documented, it would suggest that the null effect of context familiarity on metacognitive monitoring in Experiment 2 was spurious. However, if again no effect of context familiarity emerged, consistent with Experiment 2 but contrasting with results of Experiment 1, it would suggest that the context familiarity effect on metacognitive monitoring is limited to conditions in which participants rely on familiarity as the basis of memory decisions.
A secondary objective of the present experiment was to investigate whether associative instructions at study, used in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, are necessary for documenting the difference in the forced-report recognition accuracy between the reinstated and re-paired context conditions. To this end, we reverted to the non-associative instructions from Experiment 1, used in conjunction with our novel, recollection-driven test.
In the discussion of Experiment 1 we have argued that recognition accuracy is not affected by context reinstatement under conditions of non-associative study instructions because recognition accuracy may not be sensitive to the effects concerning recollection. If this
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reasoning is correct, then we would predict that in a recollection-driven test, accuracy would be affected by context reinstatement, even when non-associative study instructions are used.
To create a recollection-driven recognition test, a separate pre-study phase was added to the experimental procedure, in which all foils used subsequently in the recognition test were presented. Their presentation (without any context photographs) should more or less equate them on familiarity with faces presented in the actual study phase. In the test, participants were asked for each target-foil pair to endorse the face that was presented in the phase of the experiment in which faces were paired with context photographs. Because familiarity should be useless for this discrimination, the test required recollection of either temporal context of the experimental phase or recollection of a specific item-context association created at study (see Bodner & Lindsay, 2003 , or Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997 , for similar procedures). We predicted that in such a recollection-driven test a difference Materials and design were exactly the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. In the present experiment a pre-study phase was added at the beginning of the experimental procedure. In this phase, participants were presented with
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faces which were subsequently used as foils in a recognition test. Each face was presented for 2 s with passive-viewing instructions, without any reference to memory. The following study phase used the non-associative instructions from Experiment 1. The test phase was the same as in Experiment 1 and 2, except that participants were clearly instructed to indicate faces studied in the second phase of the experiment, the one in which faces were presented with landscape photos.
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . A one-way ANOVA on the accuracy of forced-report recognition yielded a significant effect of the context condition, associations is more successful in the reinstated compared to re-paired and novel context conditions. Importantly, these effects occurred despite using non-associative instructions at study. This once again indicates that participants encode item-context associations at study, even when they are not explicitly directed to do so, and that these associations can be retrieved at test when cued with reinstated contexts. The fact that item-context associations are automatically established at study is perhaps not surprising given the earlier literature speaking to this issue (e.g., Bancroft, Hockley, & Farquhar, 2013; Jou, 2010) , although it should be pointed out that recently Reder et al. (2013) re-paired and novel conditions was again reliable. Recognition performance in the present 6 For Experiment 3, we repeated the analyses of whether the side on which the target face was presented at the test affected forced-report recognition accuracy. Interestingly, in this experiment a factor of side reliably interacted with the context condition, F(2, 70) = 5.15, p = .01. This interaction arose because participantsÕ recognition performance in the re-paired context condition was markedly better when face was presented on the right (M = .62) rather than on the left (M = .44), whereas no such differences emerged for novel (.55 and .56, respectively) and reinstated (.69 and .64, respectively) context conditions. This difference for the re-paired context condition could suggests that merely presenting a target face on the same side of a familiar context photograph as at study aided participantsÕ recollection. However, it remains unclear why such beneficial effect of the position reinstatement would be limited only to familiar contexts as the lack of a parallel difference for the novel context condition would indicate. The additional analyses of confidence and DK responding with ANOVAs including the factor of side failed to produce any significant effects involving this factor (lowest p = .28).
experiment necessitated the use of recollection and the results concerning the accuracy of forced-report recognition indicated that participants did rely on recollection. The fact that under these conditions differences in metacognitive measures (both confidence and DK responding) were reliably present between re-paired and novel context conditions indicates that context familiarity underlies metacognitive processes even in recollection-driven tests. In other words, the present results join the results for DK responding in Experiment 2 in suggesting that a null effect for confidence judgments observed in Experiment 2 was spurious.
In the present study we set out to assess the context effects on metacognitive processes. Our results can be summarized as follows. (2000) showed how low luminance of a tested face deflated retrospective confidence judgments for ÔoldÕ decisions, while simultaneously increasing memory performance when the studied face was also of low luminance. This result indicates that the higher the ease of processing of a face at test, presumably a function of luminance, the higher the confidence in ÔoldÕ decisions. Our results from the re-paired versus novel context conditions parallel these findings. Just as participants attributed the fluency of processing of a test face to fluency expected from the previous study episode for a given face in the experiments by Busey et al., participants in our study attributed the feeling of familiarity evoked by context to a test face. Both types of attribution inflated retrospective confidence, producing a confidence-accuracy dissociation, as in our study recognition performance was independent of context familiarity, whereas in the study by Busey et al. recognition performance depended on study-test match in luminance, not on test luminance alone.
When discussing factors shaping metacognitive judgments such as retrospective confidence, it is important to distinguish between experience-based and theory-based processes (cf. Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004) . In short, a certain factor may affect
Context reinstatement and metacognition 28 metacognition either because it changes peopleÕs subjective feelings about stimuli, or because people have a certain theory of how this factor affects their memory processes. Applied to the confidence-accuracy dissociation under discussion, we have argued here that the effects of familiar context on confidence stem from attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response, which would be an experience-based process. However, it is also possible that people have a particular theory according to which their memory responses are by and large more likely to be correct when made in a recognizable context. After all, the results of our experiments clearly show that context often does convey information that increases memory accuracy. Although we believe that the manipulation of familiarity is very close to the notion of experience-based processes, we do not wish to dismiss here the possibility that the effects of context familiarity may originate in participantsÕ lay beliefs about context-dependency of memory. The methods for distinguishing between experience-based and theory-based processes in metacognition are currently being developed (see e.g., Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013) and these methods may be used in the future to address this issue.
Turning now to a comparison of reinstated and re-paired context conditions, it is worth evoking a recent study by Reinitz, SŽguin, Peria, and Loftus (2012; see also Reinitz, Peria, SŽguin, & Loftus, 2011) . This study demonstrated that although recognition performance for faces depends both on familiarity of a face and recollection of distinctive features of this face, recollection affects confidence to a greater extent than it does affect recognition performance, again leading to a confidence-accuracy dissociation. This observation is paralleled by our second example of a confidence-accuracy dissociation, documented in Experiment 1. In this experiment, a comparison of the reinstated versus repaired context conditions revealed that recollection strongly contributes to retrospective confidence, while leaving recognition performance mostly unaffected.
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Together, our results concerning confidence confirm that recognition accuracy and retrospective confidence can often be based on at least partially distinct psychological processes, resulting in confidence-accuracy dissociations. We wish to stress, however, that by no means should this be taken to imply that confidence is always or even most commonly dissociated from accuracy. Our results from Experiments 2 and 3 show how recollection of item-context associations can at the same time shape confidence and recognition accuracy.
This, contrasted with the results of Experiment 1, shows how the nature of confidenceaccuracy relationship is affected by the conditions of both encoding and testing.
Response withholding in memory tests
In our study we assessed not only metacognitive monitoring in the form of confidence judgments but also metacognitive control in the form of DK responding. The results for DK responding largely mirrored the effects observed with retrospective confidence judgments, with lower rates of DK responses when confidence judgments were higher and higher rates of DK responses when confidence judgments were lower. This pattern is consistent with the framework developed by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) , in which metacognitive control in the form of DK responding is dependent on the products of metacognitive monitoring, reflected in confidence judgments.
Critically, the framework of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) comparisons of free-and forced-report recall revealed that at least under some conditions people are quite likely to withhold answers that are correct (Higham, 2002; Higham & Tam, 2005 , 2006 . If this occurs in studies examining context effects in recall, then the contribution of metacognitive processes to what have been described as purely memory effects of context reinstatement cannot be dismissed. This issue awaits further research with recall procedures.
Although our study was mainly designed to investigate context effects on metacognitive processes, it also provides insights into basic memory processes. This is so because metacognition in memory tasks builds on memory information. However, as we discussed earlier, this memory information may not be necessarily of the same type as information underlying memory performance. We see this occasional discrepancy between memory and metacognition as quite beneficial for memory researchers because it provides a window of opportunity for examining memory processes that are difficult to reveal by standard memory tests (see also Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012 , for a similar approach).
The literature on context effects in recognition is mostly focused on the discussion of context-dependent discrimination. Researchers focused on recognition tests have argued whether reinstating the exact study context at test facilitates discrimination of targets and foils. The results in this respect are not entirely consistent, with some studies revealing context-dependent discrimination (e.g., Macken, 2002) and some failing to reveal it (e.g., Hockley, 2008) . This discrepancy is also visible in our own study. Context-dependent discrimination was absent in Experiment 1, where forced-report 2AFC recognition was equal in all three context conditions, but was reliably present in Experiments 2 and 3, where forcedreport 2AFC recognition was clearly best for the reinstated context condition. These results, coupled with the pattern already observed in the literature, demonstrate that the question Context reinstatement and metacognition 33
concerning context-dependent discrimination should not be whether it occurs but when it occurs. Macken suggested that such effects are most likely to occur when recognition responding is based on recollection of specific associations, as revealed in ÔrememberÕ responses. Our own results support this conclusion as context-dependent discrimination occurred when the role of recollection was promoted by specific study instructions (Experiment 2), presumably increasing the proportion of recollection-based responses, and when the nature of the recognition test was changed to directly induce more reliance on recollection (Experiment 3).
Perhaps more importantly, our results demonstrate how the absence of contextdependent discrimination should not be taken to imply the absence of recollection of itemcontext associations. Based on the previous results and our incorrect logic, we initially assumed that the lack of effects of context reinstatement in recognition accuracy can be straightforwardly used to infer the nature of recognition processes. Our results reveal the precarious nature of such reasoning by demonstrating how recognition accuracy can be insensitive to memory processes occurring in a recognition test. This observation underscores the necessity of distinguishing between a cognitive process and the measure used to tap into this process. Although it may sound quite counterintuitive, it appears that recognition tests are not necessarily sensitive to processes involved in recognition. To the extent to which cognitive researchers are interested in cognitive processes, and not merely in their reflections in particular laboratory tasks, we argue that they should strive to use a variety of measures to assess cognitive processes. We believe that the examination of metacognitive measures may prove of further use in this endeavour.
Context outside laboratory
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We will devote the final words of the present paper to possible applied consequences of our results. The issue of context reinstatement plays a prominent role in research on eyewitness memory. Indeed, the context reinstatement manipulation constitutes a vital part of the widely used and investigated protocol of eliciting eyewitness testimony Ð the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992 Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009; Milne & Bull, 2002) , as well is in our laboratory procedure. However, an issue that, at least to our knowledge, did not caught researchers attention is that familiar context may inflate peopleÕs confidence concerning their memory reports even when it has no power of augmenting memory. This is particularly problematic in the eyewitness context as confidence expressed by an eyewitness is a major clue that people use to assess the credibility of the eyewitness (e.g., Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995) . Reinstating context can thus have an effect of increasing the perceived credibility of an eyewitness quite independently of any possible beneficial effect on memory.
The present experiment involved faces as to-be-remembered stimuli. This kind of stimuli is important for the eyewitness literature, which is often concerned with the processes 
